Purpose:
The major outcome sought in phenomenology is the description of the structures of consciousness of everyday experiences as experienced at first hand (Grbich, 2011, p. 86).
Phenomenology has been practiced in various guises for centuries, but it came into its own in the early 20th century in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others. Phenomenological issues of intentionality, consciousness, qualia, and first-person perspective have been prominent in recent philosophy of mind (Smith, 2011).
involves intensive sampling of a small group and detailed exploration of particular life experiences over time (Grbirch, 93).
History:
Husserl called it, "the science of the essence of consciousness"(Grbirch, 2011, p.85).
Husserl was influenced by Descartes: "the object is said to possess objective reality insofar as it exists by representation in thought . . .; for objective reality is in truth a subjective reality". In other words, perception of the reality of an object is dependent on a subject (Moustakas, 1994, p. 27)
The focus is on first person experiences and the trait of intentionality (Grbirch, 2011, p.85)
Intentionality links humans with their physical contexts (Grbirch, 2011, p.85)
all phenomena are objects (Grbirch, 2011, p.85)
phenomenological reduction (bracketing) is the process of stepping back and away from "taken-for-grated reality"in order to reflect. This is the transcendental aspect of Husserl's phenomenology (Grbirch, 2011, p.85).
transcendental:
We are now in a position to understand Husserl's choice of terminology better. The transcendental-phenomenological reduction is called "transcendental" because it uncovers the ego for which everything has meaning and existence. It is called "phenomenological" because it transforms the world into mere phenomenon. It is called "reduction" because it leads us back (Lat. reducer) to the source of the meaning and existence of the experienced world, in so far as it is experienced,'6 by uncovering intentionality (Schmitt, 1959, p.240)
Throughout his writings of the middle and late period Husserl insisted that phenomenology is a reflective enterprise.'8 It seems reasonable therefore to interpret the transcendental-phenomenological reduction as a phenomenological description of the transition from a non-reflective to a reflective attitude, albeit a reflective attitude of a particular kind (Schmitt, 1959, p.240)
Reflection, on the other hand, involves just this critical detachment (Schmitt, 1959, p. 241)
The epoch thus renders questionable what previously had been taken as certain and self-evident. This does not mean that experience as a whole is rejected. To question something is not to deny it (Schmitt, 1959, p.243)
Only in the reflective attitude do we begin to separate what is really given in experience, what close and attentive scrutiny reveals to be "really there" from what was merely added to this experience by the observer, as interpretation or anticipation (Schmitt, 1959, p.243)
in reflection, the facts which had previously seemed self-evident have become questionable, and thus facts which they had overshadowed before or which, in relation to them, had seemed insignificant now come to light and must be examined carefully. The scope of relevant subject matter is widened considerably as soon as we make the transition from thinking to reflection (Schmitt, 1959, p.244)
transcendental-phenomenological reduction shows all the common features of the transition from thinking to reflection (Schmitt, 1959, p.245)
natural:
Naturalistic constitutive phenomenology studies how consciousness constitutes or takes things in the world of nature, assuming with the natural attitude that consciousness is part of nature (Smith, 2011)
empirical:
Comes from Van Kaam (1966). In studying the experience of feeling understood, his emphasis was in obtaining descriptions of their feelings (Moustakas, 1994, p.12)
"In light of a very quantitative and experimental world of science, he felt that experiemental designs imposed on subjects, 'may distort rather that disclose a given behavior through an imposition of restricted theoretical sonstructs on the rll meaning and richness of human behavior' (Van Kaam, 1966 p. 14 in Moustakas, 1994, p.12).
"This method leads, idealy, to the type of description and calssification of phenomena which can be affimed by ezperts in teh same field . . . It is pre-empirical, pre-experimental, and pre-statistical; it is experiential and qualitative. It sets the stage for more accurate empirical investigations by lessening the risk of a premature selection of methods and categories"(Van Kaam, 1966 p. 295 in Moustakas, 1994, p.12).
Giorgi defines two levels in the process: (I) original date is comprised of naive descriptions obtained through open-ended questions and dialouge; and (II) description of the structures of the experience based on reflective analysis and interpretation of the research participant's account or story (Moustakas, 1994, p. 13)
hermeneutical:
"the interpretive structures of experience of texts"(Grbirch, p.91). Either from outside as an objective reading (what is going, or went on here), or from inside (interaction of reader and text).
Bracketing not done with hermeneutical phenomenology (Grbirch, 2011, p.93)
works cited
Grbirch, C. (2011). Qualitative data analysis. London: Sage
Schmitt, R. (1959), Husserl's Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 238-24.
The major outcome sought in phenomenology is the description of the structures of consciousness of everyday experiences as experienced at first hand (Grbich, 2011, p. 86).
Phenomenology has been practiced in various guises for centuries, but it came into its own in the early 20th century in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others. Phenomenological issues of intentionality, consciousness, qualia, and first-person perspective have been prominent in recent philosophy of mind (Smith, 2011).
involves intensive sampling of a small group and detailed exploration of particular life experiences over time (Grbirch, 93).
History:
Husserl called it, "the science of the essence of consciousness"(Grbirch, 2011, p.85).
Husserl was influenced by Descartes: "the object is said to possess objective reality insofar as it exists by representation in thought . . .; for objective reality is in truth a subjective reality". In other words, perception of the reality of an object is dependent on a subject (Moustakas, 1994, p. 27)
The focus is on first person experiences and the trait of intentionality (Grbirch, 2011, p.85)
Intentionality links humans with their physical contexts (Grbirch, 2011, p.85)
all phenomena are objects (Grbirch, 2011, p.85)
phenomenological reduction (bracketing) is the process of stepping back and away from "taken-for-grated reality"in order to reflect. This is the transcendental aspect of Husserl's phenomenology (Grbirch, 2011, p.85).
transcendental:
We are now in a position to understand Husserl's choice of terminology better. The transcendental-phenomenological reduction is called "transcendental" because it uncovers the ego for which everything has meaning and existence. It is called "phenomenological" because it transforms the world into mere phenomenon. It is called "reduction" because it leads us back (Lat. reducer) to the source of the meaning and existence of the experienced world, in so far as it is experienced,'6 by uncovering intentionality (Schmitt, 1959, p.240)
Throughout his writings of the middle and late period Husserl insisted that phenomenology is a reflective enterprise.'8 It seems reasonable therefore to interpret the transcendental-phenomenological reduction as a phenomenological description of the transition from a non-reflective to a reflective attitude, albeit a reflective attitude of a particular kind (Schmitt, 1959, p.240)
Reflection, on the other hand, involves just this critical detachment (Schmitt, 1959, p. 241)
The epoch thus renders questionable what previously had been taken as certain and self-evident. This does not mean that experience as a whole is rejected. To question something is not to deny it (Schmitt, 1959, p.243)
Only in the reflective attitude do we begin to separate what is really given in experience, what close and attentive scrutiny reveals to be "really there" from what was merely added to this experience by the observer, as interpretation or anticipation (Schmitt, 1959, p.243)
in reflection, the facts which had previously seemed self-evident have become questionable, and thus facts which they had overshadowed before or which, in relation to them, had seemed insignificant now come to light and must be examined carefully. The scope of relevant subject matter is widened considerably as soon as we make the transition from thinking to reflection (Schmitt, 1959, p.244)
transcendental-phenomenological reduction shows all the common features of the transition from thinking to reflection (Schmitt, 1959, p.245)
natural:
Naturalistic constitutive phenomenology studies how consciousness constitutes or takes things in the world of nature, assuming with the natural attitude that consciousness is part of nature (Smith, 2011)
empirical:
Comes from Van Kaam (1966). In studying the experience of feeling understood, his emphasis was in obtaining descriptions of their feelings (Moustakas, 1994, p.12)
"In light of a very quantitative and experimental world of science, he felt that experiemental designs imposed on subjects, 'may distort rather that disclose a given behavior through an imposition of restricted theoretical sonstructs on the rll meaning and richness of human behavior' (Van Kaam, 1966 p. 14 in Moustakas, 1994, p.12).
"This method leads, idealy, to the type of description and calssification of phenomena which can be affimed by ezperts in teh same field . . . It is pre-empirical, pre-experimental, and pre-statistical; it is experiential and qualitative. It sets the stage for more accurate empirical investigations by lessening the risk of a premature selection of methods and categories"(Van Kaam, 1966 p. 295 in Moustakas, 1994, p.12).
Giorgi defines two levels in the process: (I) original date is comprised of naive descriptions obtained through open-ended questions and dialouge; and (II) description of the structures of the experience based on reflective analysis and interpretation of the research participant's account or story (Moustakas, 1994, p. 13)
hermeneutical:
"the interpretive structures of experience of texts"(Grbirch, p.91). Either from outside as an objective reading (what is going, or went on here), or from inside (interaction of reader and text).
Bracketing not done with hermeneutical phenomenology (Grbirch, 2011, p.93)
works cited
Grbirch, C. (2011). Qualitative data analysis. London: Sage
Schmitt, R. (1959), Husserl's Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 238-24.
Smith, David Woodruff, "Phenomenology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/phenomenology/>.